2 febbraio 2019 15:09 Un lancio di un missile da un sistema russo Iskander. Gli Stati Uniti dicono che 9M729, uno dei missili lanciati da Iskander, viola INF. © Sputnik / StringerIl presidente Vladimir Putin ha detto che Mosca sta fermando la sua partecipazione all’accordo nucleare dell’era della Guerra Fredda dopo la decisione di Washington…
Il segretario PCcino ‘Ponzio Pelato’ non ha mai letto il Che fare? di Nikolaj Lenin, ma il Chi? di Alfonso Signorini.
Il Ministero della Difesa russo dichiarava che 95 dei 105 missili lanciati da Stati Uniti, Regno Unito e Francia furono intercettati dalle difese aeree della Siria, impiegando sistemi di difesa aerea S-125, Buk e Kvadrat di fabbricazione sovietica, proteggendo integralmente 4 principali basi aeree siriane; infatti. i 12 missili lanciati sull’aeroporto militare di al-Dumayr furono tutti intercettati, così come i 18 missili contro l’aeroporto militare di Bulayl, i 12 missili contro l’aeroporto militare di Shayrat, i 9 missili contro l’aeroporto militare di Mazah e i 16 missili contro l’aeroporto militare di Homs. Dei 30 missili lanciati su Barzah e Jaramana, a Damasco, solo 7 colpivano l’edificio per la ricerca farmaceutica. Ovviamente, il Pentagono, per nascondere tale imbarazzante fallimento, si esibiva nella conferenza stampa il tenente-generale Kenneth McKenzie, propalando dichiarazioni grottesche tese a nascondere i fatti e a celebrare dei successi che, se fossero veri, sarebbero le mera illustrazione di un piano operativo delirante. “Riteniamo che tutti i nostri missili abbiano raggiunto i loro obiettivi“, dichiarava McKenzie; e cosa significa tale affermazione?
1. I missili lanciati dagli USA colpivano “fabbriche e depositi di armi chimiche” senza preoccupazioni sull’eventuale diffusione di agenti chimici nelle vicine aree abitate; gli USA sapevano che non c’era nulla all’interno. Soprattutto ciò avveniva poco prima che gli ispettori sulle armi chimiche iniziassero le indagini presso Damasco.
2. Gli USA avrebbero sparato 105 missili contro solo tre obiettivi; tale affermazione si commenta da sé. Ovvero, i siriani avevano abbattuto il 90% di tali missili, perciò gli Stati Uniti parlavano di aver voluto attaccare solo i tre obiettivi che erano riusciti effettivamente a colpire, e questo con ben tre ondate di lanci di missili eseguiti con intervalli di circa un’ora…
3. Tre missili “fortunati” avevano colpito fabbriche di armi chimiche di cui gli Stati Uniti non avevano mai parlato in 7 anni (poiché erano nel territorio occupato dai terroristi fino a ieri). Volevano essere sicuri di cancellare le prove?La forza d’aggressione alla Siria era composta da 2 cacciatorpediniere e 1 incrociatore statunitensi, 1 fregata francese, 4 cacciabombardieri Tornado inglesi e 2 bombardieri B-1B statunitensi. L’incrociatore Monterrey aveva lanciato 30 missili Tomahawk, il cacciatorpediniere Higgins 23 Tomahawk, il cacciatorpediniere Laboon 7 Tomahawk, il sottomarino John Warner 6 Tomahawk, i 2 bombardieri B-1 21 missili JASSM, i 4 cacciabombardieri Tornado GR4 16 missili Storm-shadow. Si era parlato di aerei francesi, ma non è vero, poiché di francese c’erano solo i missili Storm-shadow usati dagli inglesi.Secondo gli statunitensi, i 3 impianti “obiettivi ufficiali” furono colpiti da ben 105 missili da crociera:
– 76 missili contro il centro di ricerca di Barzah, a Damasco
– 22 missili contro una non ben definita struttura “chimica”
– 7 missili contro un non ben definito “bunker chimico”
Gli ultimi due si trovavano fino a pochi giorni prima in territorio controllato dai terroristi armati e finanziati da USA, Regno Unito, Francia, Qatar, Turchia ed Arabia Saudita…
Il Centro ricerche di Barzah:Ciò che McKanzie diceva era che questi 3 edifici del centro furono colpiti da 76 missili da crociera!!! “Affermazione ridicola e senza la minima credibilità”. Sarebbero stati colpiti nel modo seguente:In Siria furono attaccate strutture simili con un missile da crociera per edificio. Si può pensare di voler essere sicuri? 2 o 3 andavano bene per edificio; ma qui gli Stati Uniti affermano di averne lanciato 76 contro 3 edifici…
Gli altri due obiettivi attaccati, secondo gli Stati Uniti, erano un deposito ad Him Shinshar:Sempre secondo gli statunitensi, la struttura sarebbe stata colpita da 22 missili da crociera!!! Altra affermazione ridicola e senza la minima credibilità. Tanto più che a differenza di Barzah, si trattava di 3 capannoni in lamiera, cioè strutture fragilissime. Un missile per struttura bastava. Per capire di cosa si parla, si guardi questa foto elaborata per mostrare cosa significherebbe lanciarvi 22 missili da crociera:Come si può vedere dalle immagini satellitari, gli Stati Uniti mentono quando affermano che il sito fu colpito da 22 missili da crociera.Il terzo dei bersagli attaccati, secondo gli Stati Uniti, era il bunker “chimico” di Him Shinshar:Secondo gli statunitensi, l’installazione sarebbe stata colpita da 7 missili da crociera!!! Ancora un’affermazione senza la minima credibilità. Ecco la foto ritoccata per mostrare cosa significherebbero 7 missili da crociera su quest’installazione:Come si può notare non ci sono 7 impatti di missili da alcuna parte.In realtà, la difesa aerea siriana è interconnessa con quella russa che, attraverso i sistemi di collegamento, incrementava l’efficienza della difesa aerea della Siria basata sui sistemi aggiornati Buk, Pantsir, S-200 e S-125 Pechora-M, coordinati da moltiplicatori di forza come aerei AWACS, sistemi ECM, sistemi radar e sistemi delle navi russe. Ad esempio, gli inglesi avevano lanciato i loro missili su Homs, ma furono tutti abbattuti dai sistemi di guerra elettronica siriani. Gli inglesi vi perdevano 50 milioni di dollari di armamenti, e senza colpire nulla. Infine, i sistemi di difesa aerea siriani impiegati per abbattere i missili da crociera statunitensi furono i seguenti: Pantsir-S1, Buk-M2E, S-125/S-125M, Osa, S-75 e cannoni antiaerei, che riuscivano ad abbattere circa 97 missili. Non furono impiegati i missili S-200.Conclusione
Ma ciò che infastidisce più di tutto sono gli espertidiminkia, dai generaloni della NATO-in-pensione-e-in-TV, agli esperti in geominkiate di regime, ospiti fissi dei talk show piddiotizzanti, fino ad arrivare al circo delle pulci neo-ottomaniaci, i paggetti erdoganisti pseudo-eurasiatici che mentre abbaiano contro Egitto e India, che condannano l’aggressione alla Siria, osannano il sultano pazzo Erdogan che invece partecipava a tale aggressione alla Siria. Ebbene, tale ammasso di ciarpame, pur avendo sbattuto la faccia contro i fatti (dalla testa dura) e non sapendo come rigirarsi tale sonora pedata al culo ricevuta dal popolo e dall’esercito della Siria, cerca ogni modo di deformare i fatti e giustificare le proprie avventatezze ideologiche scalando pareti vetrate di grattacieli, pur di non dire che i supermen che albergano al Pentagono, come insegna la propaganda di Raiset-La47, hanno racimolato l’ennesima bastonata, travisata sempre da vittoria dalla suddetta propaganda, con tanto di coretto di corvi catastrofisti filo-imperialisti che, camuffati da eterni finti filo-russi e filo-siriani, sempre denigrano la Russia per l’“immobilismo” mostrato in Siria.
Un esempio? Sono i geniacci che ci dicono che l’attacco era ‘concordato’ tra Trump e Putin; ebbene tale scherzo comprendeva 105 missili da crociera, al modico prezzo di 1,5 milioni di dollari al pezzo. Si facciano i calcoli, e si dica che tale spesa era solo intesa a tirar su uno ‘scherzo’ che copre di ridicolo il Pentagono, la NATO, i governi di tre potenze occidentali, il complesso militar-industriale degli USA, l’intero apparato mediatico del ‘libero’ occidente, ecc.; e non si badi a cosa certi “communists”, col vitalizio e sempre in prima linea nei talk shaw berlusconiani, arrivano a dire (“i russi hanno disattivato le difese antimissile in Siria”) pur di denigrare l’operato dell’alleanza russo-siriana e celebrare i “successoni” immaginari degli USA. Non possono che dire questo, pena l’esclusione dai salotti televisivi da dove condurre una novella immaginosa ‘rivoluzione d’ottobre’…
L’unico scherzo in tutto questo, non è l’attacco missilistico alla Siria, ma l’indecoroso spettacolo messo su da tale torma di geocazzari d’ogni risma e tendenza, affratellati dal comune odio per la Russia e dal tentativo di salvare il grugno lesionato di Trump; nonostante perfino il segretario alla Difesa Mattis e il Capo di Stato Maggiore statunitense Dunford, relazionando sull’attacco missilistico, abbiano chiarito che qualsiasi responsabilità su tutto questo, anche futura, ricadeva solo su Trump, con implicita presa di distanza.
Alessandro Lattanzio, 15/04/2018
Mentre il mondo guarda il dito (la Corea del Nord), Israele ha lanciato nella mattina di oggi un missile nelle acque del Mediterraneo. Lo riporta il principale quotidiano del paese ‘Haaretz‘. L’aviazione israeliana ha poi confermato attraverso le reti sociali, specificando che si tratta di un sistema di propulsione.
Testimoni riferiscono che il lancio sia partito dalla base di Palmachim, vicino la costa mediterránea, e che il missile ha lasciato una scia visibile per diversi chilometri. Lo riporta Press TV.
Sugli obiettivi che abbiano mosso il regime di Tel Aviv ad effettuare questo lancio non ci sono al momento certezze, così come sull’esito del test. La propulsione a razzo è spesso progettata per il lancio di sistemi potenti come i satelliti e i missili balistici. Allo stesso tempo, il sistema può essere utilizzato per la creazione di missili terra-terra o per i missili terra-aria come gli Arrow.
Thousands of South Koreans have protested against a planned deployment of US-built THAAD missile system in Seongju which is home to 40,000 people.
Italian military analyst Manlio Dinucci explains what he believes is the biggest danger emanating from the US deployment of its missile defense network in Romania and Poland.
NATO officials’ explanations aside, everyone, including the Russian president, seems to understand perfectly well that the US’s shiny new Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Deveselu, Romania, and the one being built in Redzikowo, Poland are directed against Russia.
And the reason, writes Il Manifesto military analyst Manlio Dinucci, is not because the system threatens to intercept Russian ICBMs and put the nuclear balance of power in jeopardy. “The reality,” he writes, “is much worse.”
In the course of his meeting with leaders from Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway in Washington last week, President Obama reiterated his ‘concerns’ “about Russia’s growing aggressive military presence and posture in the Baltic-Nordic region,” and reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to collective defense in Europe.
“This commitment,” Dinucci recalls, “was demonstrated a day earlier at Romania’s Deveselu air base in the form of the inauguration of the US Aegis Ashore land-based missile defense system.”
“NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who was present at the ceremony along with US Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and Romanian Prime Minister Dacian Ciaolos, thanked the United States, because with this facility, ‘the first-of-its-kind land-based missile defense installation’, would significantly increase ‘the capability to defend European allies against the proliferation of ballistic missiles from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.'”
The secretary general “also announced the start of work in Poland on another Aegis Ashore system similar to the one that came online in Romania. The two land-based facilities are an addition to four US Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships based at the Spanish base of Rota and deployed across the Mediterranean, the Black and Baltic seas, the powerful Aegis radar installation in Turkey and a command center in Germany.”
Speaking at the ceremony, Stoltenberg sought to emphasize that “the site in Romania as well as the one in Poland are not directed against Russia. The interceptors are too few and located too far south or too close to Russia to be able to intercept Russian ICBMs.”
“And what is the technology Stoltenberg is referring to?” Dinucci asked. “Both the ship- and land-based Aegis systems feature the Lockheed Martin Mark 41 vertical launching system, using tubes (located in the belly of the ship or in an underground bunker), launching the SM-3 interceptor missile.”
Hence, the analyst notes, “this system, called a ‘shield’, actually has an offensive function. If the US managed to achieve a reliable ABM system, they could keep Russia under the threat of a nuclear first strike, relying on the ability of their ‘shield’ to neutralize any possibility of retaliation. In reality, this is not possible at this stage, because Russia and even China are now taking a series of measures to make it impossible to intercept all their nuclear warheads in a missile attack. What then, is the US really trying to achieve with its Europe-based Aegis system?”
In fact, Dinucci notes, “this is something Lockheed Martin itself openly explains. Illustrating the technical characteristics of the Mark 41 vertical launching system…the company stresses the ability to launch ‘missiles for every mission: anti-air, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and to attack ground targets.’ Launch tubes can be adapted for any missiles, including the type ‘used for defense against ballistic missile attack, and long-range [cruise].’ It even specifies the types: ‘the SM-3 [interceptor] and the Tomahawk cruise missile’.”
“In light of this technical explanation,” the analyst writes, “the justification provided by Stoltenberg – that the instillation at Deveselu is deployed ‘too close to Russia to intercept Russian ICBMs’ is anything but reassuring. Because no one can really know about what kind of missiles are actually deployed in the vertical launchers at the Deveselu base, or on the ships which sail near Russian territorial waters.”
Moscow, Dinucci adds, cannot even be certain that the missiles aren’t nuclear-armed.
Therefore, the military analyst argues, “the inauguration of the missile defense base at Deveselu may signal the end of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces, signed by the US and the Soviet Union and 1987, which facilitated the elimination of land-based missiles with a range of between 500-5,500 km, including the Soviet RSD-10s and the US Pershing 2s and Tomahawks based in Germany and Italy.”
It turns out “that the Lockheed Martin launchers also contain a TTIP missile,” Dinucci concludes.
Media and military experts have engaged in a discussion of the US military concept of a Prompt Global Strike (PGS), a system that would enable Washington to deliver precision-guided non-nuclear airstrikes anywhere in the world in less than an hour. Defense analyst Konstantin Sivkov discusses the idea, and Russia’s inevitable response.
In his analysis, published by the independent online newspaper Svobodnaya Pressa, Sivkov begins by recalling that the general media and expert appraisal of the concept is that it would be a danger to the entire world, if ever implemented.
“Generalizing the appraisals of the Prompt Global Strike program, it emerges that this is an extremely dangerous idea that would become a deadly threat for almost all nations. At the core of this idea is the assertion that precision conventional weapons can be comparable in their destructive power to nuclear weapons. Accordingly, their massed use against Washington’s foes could bring them to their knees.”
“But is this really the case?” Sivkov asks. “What is behind the concept of the Prompt Global Strike, and is it really possible to bomb an enemy into capitulation? How serious a threat is this concept with regard to its possible use against Russia?”
At its core, the doctor of military sciences recalls, the concept “involves the creation of a complete combat system, and apart from the strike component also requires subsystems including reconnaissance and surveillance, command and communications posts, as well as jamming systems.”
“The weapons used under this concept would include land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, as well as sea- and air-launched hypersonic long-range cruise missiles. In the long term, space-based platforms can also be used to launch attacks.”
Sivkov notes that ballistic missiles are currently the most likely candidate to meet the requirements laid out by the concept of the Prompt Global Strike. “They provide for the high-precision destruction of targets (with a CEP accuracy of 100-150 meters), a short delivery time (no more than 30-40 minutes), and high speed of the warhead in the target area, allowing them to destroy objects buried deep underground. Their large throw-weight (up to 3.5 tons) allows for the use of various types of warheads.”
“However, there are a number of issues that make the use of conventionally-equipped ballistic missiles problematic.”
To begin with, the analyst recalls, “the Russian missile surveillance system (and that of China, in the near future), may classify the group launch of such missiles (and the guaranteed destruction of a single object will require at least 2-3 such missiles) as a nuclear attack, leading to a retaliatory nuclear strike.”
“Secondly, the START treaties limit the total number of deployed ballistic missiles, and make no distinction between nuclear and conventionally equipped weapons. In other words, equipping ground and sea-based ballistic missiles with conventional warheads can only be done through a corresponding reduction in the number of deployed nuclear missiles.”
Therefore, another important component of the Prompt Global Strike initiative is the Boeing X-51A, a prospective missile expected to be capable of hypersonic flight at a speed of 6,500-7,500 km/h.
“However,” Sivkov notes, “tests of this system have not yet yielded the expected results. And while the X-51A program has not been closed, it can only be expected to appear in the medium term, and to be adopted into service in sufficient quantities only in the long term.”
“Therefore, the US military is not expected to receive any fundamentally new weapons systems giving the Prompt Global Strike initiative any operationally significant effect in the medium and even long term perspective.”
In this connection, the analyst says, “the US may in the medium term rely for the most part on sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk, based on strategic, tactical and carrier aviation. The US Navy’s existing sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) have a range of up to 1,600 km, using 340-450 kg warheads with an accuracy of between 5-10 meters. These weapons can be launched from all modern vessels and submarines at the US’s disposal.”
12 such SLCMs can be placed on each of the 23 serving Los Angeles-class attack submarines. The same number can be launched from the Seawolf-class and Virginia-class subs (3 units and 9 units, respectively). “Under the program to convert Ohio-class submarines into carriers of Tomahawk missiles, each of the 4 subs were expected to carry 154 SLCMs. However, that program was closed.”
61 of the US’s new Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and its 22 Ticonderoga-class cruisers are equipped with vertical launching systems, the Arleigh Burke-class featuring the 96-cell Mark 41 VLS, and the Ticonderoga a 122-cell system.
Therefore, Sivkov notes, the US surface fleet can theoretically carry a total of 4,000 surface-ship launched cruise missiles, plus another 1,000 onboard its submarines.
“However, realistically speaking, given the need to use part of the surface fleet for other purposes, and accounting for operational readiness, ships and submarines of the US Navy can actually deploy no more than 2,500-3,000 SLCMs” at any one time.
“In addition to the Navy, US long-range strategic bombers are also equipped with long-range cruise missiles. At present, the US Air Force is equipped with about 130 strategic bombers, capable of deploying a total of about 1,200 air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Thus, in total, all [US] carriers of cruise missiles are able to launch a total of 3,700-4,200 missiles.”
Moreover, “in addition to missiles, between 2,500-3,000 tactical and carrier-based aircraft capable of striking targets at a depth of up to 600 km from the border can also be used in a first strike.”
“This,” Sivkov notes, “is quite an impressive force, and absent an effective response, is capable of destroying (knocking out) 1,000 important sites of the opponent in the potential first strike.”
However, the analyst notes, this capability does really conform to the concept of the Prompt Global Strike, for several reasons.
“Firstly, such a strike would not, in fact, be ‘prompt’, since the preparations for such a large-scale attack would require a great deal of time – 2 months or more. At this time, the US would need to implement the strategic deployment of its air and naval forces in the area of the combat mission, to create the necessary inventories, and to conduct reconnaissance on the objects subject to attack. In other words, this would no longer be the kind of air attack proposed by the Prompt Global Strike concept, but an ordinary missile-based strike.”
“Second, if the impact of such an attack could really be devastating on small (or even medium-sized) countries, it will not fully deprive them of the opportunity to resist…Therefore, in the continuation of warfare, the US would, in one way or another, have to switch to the use of traditional means of warfare. In other words, the strike’s use makes sense only if it is part of a fairly large-scale military operation in coordination with the other branches of the armed forces, and this, again, means that it will not be ‘prompt’, nor global, but an ordinary missile strike as part of the first wave of an offensive.”
Russian experts, Sivkov says, “point to the serious threat such an attack poses to the Russian nuclear forces, the destruction of which would allow the US to move on to nuclear blackmail against our country, and the rest of the world. It is in this point that they see the main essence [and danger] of the Prompt Global Strike initiative.”
“Indeed,” the expert notes, “if Russia takes a passive position and does not adequately respond to the aggressor, the resulting blow could result in the destruction of 80-90% of our nuclear arsenal. However, taking account of actual conditions, it is clear that such a blow against Russia is extremely unlikely.”
For starters, “the US can decide on such a blow against Russia only in the case of a sharp aggravation of relations between our two countries.” This scenario, he suggests, may occur if forces come to power in one or the other country ready for open conflict. So long as the existing elites, particularly in Russia, remain capable of reaching compromise, “the US will not have any desire for such grand adventurism.”
“Secondly, such a strike would be preceded by a sufficiently long period [of buildup], long enough for retaliation to occur. In this case the success of the operation would be called into question.”
“Thirdly, the duration of such a strike would last for several hours (according to computer simulations – 4-6 hours). This means that after the first 20-30 minutes, when the Russian leadership realizes the scale of the aggression (even if the aggressor achieves complete operational surprise), a decision on a retaliatory nuclear strike can be made, while most nuclear forces are still in existence. That is, a massed US conventional strike would mean provoking a retaliatory nuclear strike.”
At the same time, Sivkov warns, “a completely different picture emerges if we are talking about strikes on certain critical facilities in order to achieve a localized goal with a relatively limited number of weapons. In this case long-term preparations would not be required. The blow can be made by combat-ready forces immediately after receiving the order.”
“Such a strike can be sudden, not only operationally or strategically, but also tactically, because the flight to the target by a limited number of cruise missiles can be performed at low or extremely low altitudes, outside the observation of land-based observation systems.”
Again however, “the speed, surprise, and ‘global’ nature of the strike (up to 60 minutes according to the Prompt Global Strike concept) can be achieved only if US naval and air force groups are present in the area. This means that when it comes to the prompt response [to any rapidly emerging threats], the US is presently capable of employing only very limited forces – a few dozen long-range cruise missiles.”
“These forces can damage or destroy 1-2 large or medium-sized facilities, or 2-3 objects of military or state administration, or 1-2 field objects, such as militant training camps, or 1-2 research centers.”
“In other words,” Sivkov notes, today and in the medium term, the concept of the Prompt Global Strike will only be capable of defeating local threats, such as the elimination of an individual political leader, the destruction of the leadership of an organization which has been labelled to be terrorist, or the deprivation of individual states’ capacity to implement programs considered a threat to US national security,” etc.
Ultimately, the analyst notes, “we can assert that in the current situation and in the medium term perspective, the concept of the Prompt Global Strike makes sense only in solving problems of an exclusively local character, against objects on the territory of states which cannot respond to the aggressor, and which have no security guarantees from a third, sufficiently powerful state.”
The United States is about to activate its missile systems across Europe, despite Russia’s warnings against a systematically increasing US-led arms deployment near its borders.
Almost after a decade of pledging to protect members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Washington will on Thursday activate a web of missile systems it has deployed across Europe over the years.
American and NATO officials are slated to declare operational the so-called shield at a remote air base in Deveselu, Romania.
“We now have the capability to protect NATO in Europe,” said Robert Bell, a NATO-based envoy of US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter.
He claimed that the shield is supposed to protect Europe from an Iranian missile threat, a claim Moscow has repeatedly rejected, saying the missiles are aimed at Russia instead.
“The Iranians are increasing their capabilities and we have to be ahead of that. The system is not aimed against Russia,” Bell told reporters, adding that the system will soon be handed over to NATO command.
He echoed US State Department spokesman John Kirby who had said the system “is defensive in nature” and therefore can’t be targeted “at anybody.”
Despite American assurances, Moscow accuses Washington of trying to neutralize its nuclear arsenal and buy enough time to make a first strike on Russia in the event of war.
General Sergey Karakayev, commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (SMF), downplayed the system’s impact, saying that the Russian military was paying “special attention” to enhance their weapons and overcome US missile defense systems.
“Threats from the European segment of the missile defense system for the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) are limited and don’t critically reduce the combat capabilities of the SMF,” Karakayev (pictured below) said on Tuesday.
The general added that Russian ballistic missiles can carry new warheads and deliver them through energy-optimal trajectories in multiple directions, making their path difficult to predict for missile defense systems.
During a Senate hearing in April, US Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Brian McKeon, requested a budget boost for the Missile Defense Agency, saying the funding was crucial for upgrading US missile systems to counter Russian and Chinese missiles.
Russia does not look favorably upon the North Atlantic Organization Treaty (NATO)’s growing deployment of missiles and nuclear weapons near its borders, with the Russian President Vladimir Putin saying in June last year that if threatened by NATO, Moscow will respond to the threat accordingly.
“Until recently we were told that [Washington’s] anti-missile defense system in Europe was aimed at protecting [the US and its allies] from Iran’s missile program. Now China is told the same thing,” the diplomat said during a lecture at the Museum of Contemporary Russian History.
The remarks come at a time when Washington and Seoul have launched formal talks over the possible deployment of America’s advanced missile defense system, known as Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), to South Korea in the light of Pyongyang’s recent rhetoric, threats, as well as nuclear and missile tests.